, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 773–798 | Cite as

Monotonicity of the core-center of the airport game

  • Julio González-Díaz
  • Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo
  • Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo
  • Estela Sánchez Rodríguez
Original Paper


One of the main goals of this paper is to improve the understanding of the way in which the core of a specific cooperative game, the airport game (Littlechild and Owen, Manag Sci 20:370–372, 1973), responds to monotonicity properties. Since such properties are defined for single-valued allocation rules, we use the core-center (González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez, Int J Game Theory 36:27–46, 2007) as a proxy for the core. This is natural, since the core-center is the center of gravity of the core and its behavior with respect to a given property can be interpreted as the “average behavior” of the core. We also introduce the lower-cost increasing monotonicity and higher-cost decreasing monotonicity properties that reflect whether a variation in a particular agent’s cost is beneficial to the other agents.


Cooperative TU games Monotonicity Core Core-center  Airport games 

Mathematics Subject Classification




We want to thank William Thomson for his encouragement and insight during the writing process of this manuscript. Authors acknowledge the financial assistance of the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation through projects MTM2011-27731-C03, ECO2009-14457-C0401ECON, and from the Xunta de Galicia through project INCITE09-207-064-PR.


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Copyright information

© Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Julio González-Díaz
    • 1
  • Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo
    • 2
  • Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo
    • 2
  • Estela Sánchez Rodríguez
    • 3
  1. 1.Departamento de Estatística e Investigación OperativaUniversidade de Santiago de CompostelaSantiago de CompostelaSpain
  2. 2.Departamento de MatemáticasUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain
  3. 3.Departamento de Estatística e Investigación OperativaUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain

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