, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp 800–814 | Cite as

Bargaining and membership

  • María Gómez-RúaEmail author
  • Juan Vidal-Puga
Original Paper


In coalitional games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in her group or to exit and act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium.


Bargaining Coalitional games Coalition structure Owen value Nash equilibrium 

Mathematics Subject Classification (2010)

91A10 91A12 



A previous version of this paper, titled “Negotiating the membership,” has benefited from helpful comment from Francesc Carreras. Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación through grant ECO2011-23460 and the Xunta de Galicia through grant 10PXIB362299PR is gratefully acknowledged.


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Copyright information

© Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Facultade de CC. Económicas e EmpresariaisUniversidade de VigoVigo (Pontevedra)Spain

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