In coalitional games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in her group or to exit and act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium.
KeywordsBargaining Coalitional games Coalition structure Owen value Nash equilibrium
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010)91A10 91A12
A previous version of this paper, titled “Negotiating the membership,” has benefited from helpful comment from Francesc Carreras. Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación through grant ECO2011-23460 and the Xunta de Galicia through grant 10PXIB362299PR is gratefully acknowledged.
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