, Volume 19, Issue 1, pp 29–32 | Cite as

Comments on: Cooperative games and cost allocation problems



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© Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of OregonEugeneUSA

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