, Volume 19, Issue 1, pp 167–176 | Cite as

Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation

  • María Gómez-Rúa
  • Juan Vidal-PugaEmail author
Original Paper


We define a new value for games with a level structure and introduce a new property in these kind of games, called balanced per capita contributions, related with other properties in the literature. Further, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this value using this new property.

Level structure Value Balanced per capita contributions 

Mathematics Subject Classification (2000)

91A06 91A12 


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Copyright information

© Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departamento de Estatística e Investigación OperativaUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain
  2. 2.Research Group in Economic Analysis and Departamento de Estatística e Investigación OperativaUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain

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