Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation
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We define a new value for games with a level structure and introduce a new property in these kind of games, called balanced per capita contributions, related with other properties in the literature. Further, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this value using this new property.
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000)91A06 91A12
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