This paper defines models of cooperation among players partitioning a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players’ ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game is compared with the game in which players start cooperating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after the division.
KeywordsFair division Cooperative games Maximin partition
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000)91B32 91A12
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