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, Volume 16, Issue 1, pp 48–50 | Cite as

Comments on: Transversality of the Shapley value

  • Claus-Jochen Haake
Discussion
  • 67 Downloads

Keywords

Coalition Formation Allocation Rule Coalition Structure Simple Game Game Econ 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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  7. Shenoy PP (1979) On coalition formation: a game-theoretical approach. Int J Game Theory 8(3):133–164 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Mathematical EconomicsBielefeld UniversityBielefeldGermany

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