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, 16:1 | Cite as

Transversality of the Shapley value

  • Stefano MorettiEmail author
  • Fioravante Patrone
Invited Paper

Abstract

A few applications of the Shapley value are described. The main choice criterion is to look at quite diversified fields, to appreciate how wide is the terrain that has been explored and colonized using this and related tools.

Keywords

Coalitional game Shapley value Applied game theory Axiomatizations Game practice 

Mathematics Subject Classification (2000)

91-02 91A12 91A80 

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Copyright information

© Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Unit of Molecular EpidemiologyNational Cancer Research InstituteGenoaItaly
  2. 2.DIPTEMUniversity of GenovaGenoaItaly

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