Abstract
A few applications of the Shapley value are described. The main choice criterion is to look at quite diversified fields, to appreciate how wide is the terrain that has been explored and colonized using this and related tools.
Keywords
Coalitional game Shapley value Applied game theory Axiomatizations Game practiceMathematics Subject Classification (2000)
91-02 91A12 91A80References
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