Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked
We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. We propose natural rules (called up methods) to solve such a class of problems and axiomatically characterize them. We also prove that these methods can be interpreted as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called equal distance rule.
KeywordsAllocation problem Indivisibilities Single-peaked preferences Priority standard Up method
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000)D61 D63 91B14 91B32
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Herrero C, Martínez R (2006) Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked. Mimeo Google Scholar
- Herrero C, Villar A (1999). The equal distance rule in allocation problems with single-peaked preferences. In: Current trends in economics: theory and practice. Springer, Berlin, pp 215–223 Google Scholar
- Hokari T, Thomson W (2004) On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency. Mimeo Google Scholar
- Thomson W (1998) Consistency and its converse: an introduction. Rochester Cent Econ Res 448 Google Scholar
- Young HP (1994) Equity: theory and practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton Google Scholar