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, Volume 16, Issue 2, pp 272–283 | Cite as

Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

Original Paper

Abstract

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. We propose natural rules (called up methods) to solve such a class of problems and axiomatically characterize them. We also prove that these methods can be interpreted as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called equal distance rule.

Keywords

Allocation problem Indivisibilities Single-peaked preferences Priority standard Up method 

Mathematics Subject Classification (2000)

D61 D63 91B14 91B32 

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Copyright information

© Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones EconómicasUniversity of AlicanteAlicanteSpain
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsBrown UniversityProvidenceUSA

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