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, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 322–340 | Cite as

p-additive games: a class of totally balanced games arising from inventory situations with temporary discounts

Original Paper

Abstract

We introduce a new class of totally balanced cooperative TU games, namely p-additive games. It is inspired by the class of inventory games that arises from inventory situations with temporary discounts (Toledo Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, 2002) and contains the class of inventory cost games (Meca et al. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:481–493, 2003). It is shown that every p-additive game and its corresponding subgames have a nonempty core. We also focus on studying the character of concave or convex and monotone p-additive games. In addition, the modified SOC-rule is proposed as a solution for p-additive games. This solution is suitable for p-additive games, since it is a core-allocation which can be reached through a population monotonic allocation scheme. Moreover, two characterizations of the modified SOC-rule are provided.

Keywords

p-additive games Inventory situations with temporary discounts Totally balanced cooperative TU games Modified SOC-rule Core-allocations 

Mathematics Subject Classification (2000)

91A12 90B05 

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References

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Copyright information

© Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Operations Research CenterUniversidad Miguel Hernández, Edificio TorretamaritElcheSpain
  2. 2.Dpto. de Estudios de COHISPANIACompañía Hispania de Tasaciones y Valoraciones S.A.MadridSpain

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