Evolutionary game analysis between the government and the waste producer in the venous industry
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Abstract
The relationship between the government and the waste producer is always a representative and realistic issue, especially concerning the venous industry. This article is based on the true relationship between the government and the waste producer, uses the methods from the evolutionary game theory, and analyzes the relationship between the government and the waste producer in detail.
Keywords
venous industry government waste producer evolutionary gamePreview
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