, Volume 9, Issue 4, pp 445–459 | Cite as

A New Framework for Comparative Study of Philosophy



The aim of this essay is to outline a conceptual framework for a type of philosophy (or approach to philosophy) to be herein called “non-sentential philosophy.” Although I will primarily concern myself with the conceptual coherence of the framework in this essay, illustrations will be provided to show that the notion has rich implications for comparative studies. In particular, I believe this theoretical framework will be of interest to those looking for a way to capture the differences between certain non-Western philosophical traditions—such as Chinese philosophy—and Western philosophy, a tradition in which the sentential approach is dominant.


Sententially-structured entity Sentential predicates Sentential philosophy Non-sentential philosophy Chinese philosophy 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUtica CollegeUticaUSA

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