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Journal of Bioethical Inquiry

, Volume 6, Issue 2, pp 239–247 | Cite as

Responding to Global Poverty: Review Essay of Peter Singer, The Life you can Save

  • Christian Barry
  • Gerhard Øverland
Article

Most affluent people are at least partially aware of the great magnitude of world poverty. A great many of the affluent believe that the lives of all people everywhere are of equal fundamental worth when viewed impartially. In some contexts, at least, they will also assert that people ought to prevent serious suffering when they can do so, even at significant cost to themselves. But these same people contribute little or nothing to relief efforts or development initiatives, and do not actively pressure their governments to alter their economic policies toward poorer countries in ways that might benefit them.

Why do the affluent do so little, and demand so little of their governments, while remaining confident that they are morally decent people who generally fulfil their duties to others? Are affluent people and the governments that represent them actuallyfulfilling their duties to the global poor, despite appearances to the contrary? What kinds of changes in the behaviour of...

Keywords

Moral Judgment Risk Zone Global Poverty Banking Case Undue Risk 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public EthicsAustralian National UniversityActonAustralia
  2. 2.Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public EthicsUniversity of MelbourneParkvilleAustralia

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