Politische Vierteljahresschrift

, Volume 43, Issue 1, pp 147–161 | Cite as

Delegation aus der Sicht der Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie

  • Fabrizio Gilardi
  • Dietmar Braun
Literaturbericht

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Literatur

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Copyright information

© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften/Wiesbaden 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fabrizio Gilardi
    • 1
  • Dietmar Braun
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut d’Etudes Politiques et InternationalesUniversité de LausanneLausanneSchweiz

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