Abstract
We study the newborn, non compulsory, vaccination in a SIR model with vital dynamics. The evolution of each individual is modeled as a Markov chain. His/Her vaccination decision optimizes a criterion depending on the time-dependent aggregate (societal) vaccination rate and the future epidemic dynamics. We prove the existence of a Nash-Mean Field Games equilibrium among all individuals in the population. Then we propose a novel numerical approach to find the equilibrium and test it numerically.
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Acknowledgements
G.T. acknowledges support from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR), projects EMAQS (ANR-2011-BS01-017-01), CINE-PARA and MFG (ANR-16-CE40-0015-01).
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This article belongs to the Special Issue: Demographic and temporal heterogeneity in infectious disease epidemiology.
Appendices
Clarke generalized gradients
To recall the definition of the Clarke generalized gradients we follow the presentation in [16, section 10.1 page 194] and [17]. Let X be a Banach space, \(X^*\) its dual and \(x \in X\); also take \(f: X \rightarrow {\mathbb R}\) to be a functional which is Lipschitz with constant \(L>0\) in a neighborhood of x, that is, for some \(\epsilon > 0\), we have \(\Vert f(y)-f(z) \Vert \le L \Vert y-z \Vert \) for all y, z in the ball of center x and radius \(\epsilon \). The generalized directional derivative of f at x in the direction v, denoted \(f^o(x ; v)\), is defined as
Note that \(\Vert f^o(x,v) \Vert \le L \Vert v \Vert \) for any \(v \in X\); moreover, as function of v, the directional derivative \(f^o(x,v)\) is subadditive i.e. \( f^o(x,v+w) \le f^o(x,v)+ f^o(x,w)\), \(\forall v,w \in X\). In particular it can be lower bounded by a linear functional in \(X^*\). The (Clarke) generalized gradient of f at x denoted \(\overline{\partial }{f}(x)\) or \(\dot{f}(x)\) is the set of all such linear functionals; the formal definition is the following:
It can be shown that the Clarke generalized gradient is a non empty, convex, (weakly-\(*\)) compact subset of \(X^*\). In particular when \(X={\mathbb R}^k\) for some \(k \in {\mathbb N}^*\), \(\overline{\partial }{f}(x)\) is the convex hull of the set \(\{ \lim _{\ell \rightarrow \infty } \nabla f(x_\ell ) \}\) for any sequence \(x_\ell \) converging to x such that:
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\(\nabla f(x_\ell )\) exists \(\forall \ell \) (recall that since f is Lipschitz it is differentiable a.e.) and
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the limit \(\lim _{\ell \rightarrow \infty } \nabla f(x_\ell )\) exists.
Technical details concerning the probability of infection
Recall that \( \phi _I^{u} \left( . \right) \) is a function from \( \mathbb {R}_{+} \) to \( \left[ 0, 1 \right] \) such that, for any \(t \in \mathbb {R}_{+} \), \( \phi _I^{u} \left( t \right) \) is the probability of infection during the life of an individual, born in t and not vaccinated, when the population follows the vaccination strategy u. In mathematical terms, for any individual born in \(t \ge 0\),
In order to compute \(\phi _I^{u} \left( t \right) \) we introduce the probability \(\varphi _I^{u,t} \left( . \right) \) of infection before \(\tau \):
Hence, we have:
with
Hence,
We denote \( r^{u,t} \left( \tau \right) = \mathbb {P} \left( M^{t}_{ \tau } = S \; \vert \; M^{t}_{ t } = S \right) \) the probability of staying susceptible between t and \( \tau \). We compute this probability:
Hence, the probability of staying susceptible between t and \( \tau \) is:
Hence,
which leads to
by setting \( \psi _I^{u} \left( \tau \right) = \exp \left( - \int _0^{ \tau } \beta I^{u} \left( s \right) ds \right) \).
Finally, we just have to compute the probability of infection during the life of an individual born in t who is not vaccinated, which is:
By an integration by parts, we obtain:
In fact, this probability is solution of the differential equation:
In order to get an explicit form for \(\phi _I^{u} \left( 0 \right) \), we define, for all \(t \ge 0\):
The last function satisfies the following differential equation:
Note that:
Thus, \( \mathcal {F}_I^{u} \left( t \right) \times f_I^{u} \left( t \right) = \mathcal {F}_I^{u} \left( 0 \right) - \int _0^t \mu f_I^{u} \left( \tau \right) \) and therefore
Hence, for all \(t \ge 0\), we obtain:
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Hubert, E., Turinici, G. Nash-MFG equilibrium in a SIR model with time dependent newborn vaccination. Ricerche mat 67, 227–246 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11587-018-0365-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11587-018-0365-0