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Konformität durch Herdenverhalten

Theorie und Empirie zur Entstehung von Bestsellern
  • Marc Keuschnigg
Abhandlungen

Zusammenfassung

Die Angleichung des eigenen Verhaltens an andere Akteure kann eine kostengünstige Alternative zur eigenständigen Entscheidungsfindung darstellen. Aus soziologischer Sicht spiegelt Verhaltenskonformität damit informative soziale Einflüsse wider. Entstehungsbedingungen und Konsequenzen informationsgeleiteter Imitation werden zunächst allgemein mit einem grundlegenden Modell zu sozialem Herdenverhalten beschrieben. Anschließend werden zentrale Modellimplikationen exemplarisch anhand von prozessproduzierten Daten aus dem deutschen Buchmarkt (2001–2006) geprüft. Während unter unvollständiger Information Ausschüttungen öffentlicher Informationen sowie Äußerungen von Meinungsführern Konformitätsprozesse auslösen, zeigen diese Aufmerksamkeitsstimuli unter verbesserter Informationslage keine Wirkung. Darüber hinaus bestimmt die Informationsversorgung von Lesern die Güte entstehender Bestseller. Die Untersuchung von Nachfrageprozessen in Büchermärkten belegt insgesamt die Brauchbarkeit des Herdenmodells.

Schlüsselwörter

Bestseller Buchmarkt Herdenverhalten Imitation Konformität Weisheit der Vielen 

Conformity through herd behavior

Theoretical arguments and empirical results on the emergence of bestsellers

Abstract

The adjustment of one’s own actions to the behavior of others offers an inexpensive alternative to self-reliant reasoning. Thus, from a sociological perspective conformity mirrors informative social influences. First, a basic model of social herding is presented, which describes initial conditions and consequences of informational imitation. Central implications of the model are then tested using process-produced data from the German book market (2001–2006). While the release of public information as well as announcements by opinion leaders trigger conformity under imperfect information, these stimuli show no effects when the general availability of information is improved. Moreover, the availability of information among readers determines the quality of emerging bestsellers. Altogether, the model of herd behavior proves useful in understanding demand processes in book markets.

Keywords

Bestsellers Book market Conformity Crowd wisdom Herd behavior Imitation 

Notes

Danksagung

Für Verbesserungsvorschläge danke ich den Herausgebern, einem anonymen Gutachter sowie Norman Braun, Patrick Riordan, Jan Schikora und Tobias Wolbring.

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Copyright information

© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für SoziologieLudwig-Maximilians-Universität MünchenMünchenDeutschland

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