Advertisement

Vom Experiment zur Praxis: Wie moralische Argumente wirtschaftliche Selbstinteressen beeinflussen

  • Martin SchröderEmail author
Abhandlungen

Zusammenfassung

Wie beeinflussen moralische Argumente wirtschaftlich selbstinteressiertes Handeln? Laborexperimente von Verhaltensökonomen untersuchen dies, doch ihre zentralen Ergebnisse wurden noch nicht in der Praxis getestet. Ein Forschungsprojekt rekonstruierte anhand von Fallstudien, wie moralische Argumente in Diskussionen um Produktionsverlagerung wirtschaftliche Selbstinteressen beeinflussen. Es zeigte sich, dass moralisches Verhalten, welches im Diktator- Ultimatum- und Kollektivgutspiel nachgewiesen wird, auch reales wirtschaftliches Handeln beeinflusst. Menschen verzichten auf die Maximierung ihres materiellen Nutzens, um moralischen Verhaltensregeln zu entsprechen. Statt strikter materieller Nutzenmaximierung verhalten sie sich reziprozitär. Die Ergebnisse verhaltensökonomischer Experimente, aber auch die Rekonstruktion wirtschaftlichen Handelns, verweisen somit auf ein Akteursmodell, das Gegenseitigkeit und auch gesellschaftliche Rolle beachtet und dadurch wirtschaftliches Handeln in vielen Situationen präziser erklärt als bisher vorherrschende Modelle. Dieses Modell wiederum in Laborexperimenten zu testen, wird aufgrund der Ergebnisse dieses Artikels nahegelegt.

Schlüsselwörter

Verhaltensökonomie Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung Moral Reziprozität 

From behavioral experiments to case studies: how moral arguments influence economic self-interest

Abstract

How do moral arguments influence economic self-interests? Behavioral economists try to answer this question using experiments, but their central results have not yet been tested in real economic life. A research project therefore reconstructed how moral arguments influenced economic self-interests in case studies of discussions about relocation. The results indicate that an orientation towards morality, as in the dictator- ultimatum- and collective goods game, also seems to influence how interests are defined and pursued in real economic life. Instead of maximizing economic self-interest, actors behave reciprocally. Results of behavioral experiments as well as the observation of case studies of economic behavior therefore hint towards economic actors that are influenced by reciprocity and social roles. This allows for a more precise understanding of economic behavior in many situations. Testing this in experiments of behavioral economics is in turn advocated based on the results of this article.

Keywords

Behavioral economics Empirical economic-research Experimental economic-research Morality Reciprocity 

Literatur

  1. Aspers, Patrik. 2004. Empirical phenomenology. An approach for qualitative research. Papers in Social Research Methods. Qualitative Series No 9. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, Methodology Institute. http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/methodologyInstitute/pdf/QualPapers/Aspers-Patrik-Phenomenology04.pdf.
  2. Burger, Jerry M. 2009. Replicating milgram would people still obey today? American Psychologist 64:1–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Camerer, Colin F. 1997. Progress in behavioral game theory. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 11:167–188.Google Scholar
  4. Diekmann, Andreas. 2008. Soziologie und Ökonomie: Der Beitrag experimenteller Wirtschaftsforschung zur Sozialtheorie. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 60:528–550.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Durkheim, Émile. 1953. The determination of moral facts (1924). In Sociology and Philosophy, Hrsg. Émile Durkheim, 35–62. Glencoe: Free Press.Google Scholar
  6. Eckstein, Harry. 1975. Case studies and theory in political science. In Handbook of political science, Hrsg. Fred Greenstein und Nelson Polby, 79–138. Reading: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar
  7. Etzioni, Amitai. 1988. The moral dimension. Toward a new economics. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
  8. Etzioni, Amitai. 2003. Toward a new socio-economic paradigm. Socio-Economic Review 1:105–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Fehr, Ernst, und Urs Fischbacher. 2005. The economics of strong reciprocity. In Moral Sentiments and material interests. The foundations of cooperation in economic life, Hrsg. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert T. Boyd, und Ernst Fehr, 151–192. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  10. Fehr, Ernst, und Simon Gächter. 2002. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415:137–140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger, und Arno Riedl. 1993. Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:437–459.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Fernlich 2. Interview. (11.01.2008, 13:00–14:30).Google Scholar
  13. Fernlich 4. Interview. (06.12.2007, 14:00–16:00).Google Scholar
  14. Forsythe, Robert, Joel L. Horowitz, N.E. Savin, und Martin Sefton. 1994. Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games and Economic Behavior 6:347–369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Freud, Sigmund. 1992. Das Ich und das Es. Bd. 11 (1923). Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer.Google Scholar
  16. Friedman, Milton. 2001. The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits (1970). In Business Ethics, Hrsg. Robert Almeder, James Humber, und Milton Snoyenbos, 72–78. New York: Prometheus Books.Google Scholar
  17. George, Alexander L., und Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case studies and theory development in the social science. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  18. Gerring, John. 2004. What is a case study and what is it good for? American Political Science Review 98:341–354.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Gintis, Herbert. 2010. Towards a renaissance of economic theory. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 73:34–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Gintis, Herbert, Samuel Bowles, Robert T. Boyd, und Ernst Fehr. 2005. Moral sentiments and material interests: Origins, evidence, and consequences. In Moral sentiments and material interests: The foundations of cooperation in economic life, Hrsg. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert T. Boyd, und Ernst Fehr, 3–39. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  21. Glaser, Barney G., und Anselm L. Strauss. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for qualitative research. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.Google Scholar
  22. Gläser, Jochen, und Grit Laudel. 2004. Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse als Instrumente rekonstruierender Untersuchungen. 2. Aufl. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.Google Scholar
  23. Gouldner, Alvin W. 1960. The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American Sociological Review 25:161–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Greiner, Ben, und Axel Ockenfels. 2009. Vom Labor ins Feld: Die Ökonomie des Vertrauens. In Wirtschaftssoziologie. 49. Sonderheft der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Hrsg. Jens Beckert und Christoph Deutschmann, 219–242. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.Google Scholar
  25. Güth, Werner, Rolf Schmittberger, und Bernd Schwarze. 1982. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3:367–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Hall, Peter. 2007. Systematic process analysis: When and how to use it. European Political Science 7:304–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Healy, Kieran. 2004. Altruism as an organizational problem: The case of organ procurement. American Sociological Review 69:387–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Healy, Kieran. 2006. Last best gifts. Altruism and the market for human blood and organs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  29. Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, und Ernst Fehr. 2001. In search of homo economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. The American Economic Review 91:73–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, und Ernst Fehr. 2004. Introduction and guide to the volume. In Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, Hrsg. Joseph P. Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, und Ernst Fehr, 1–7. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Herrmann, Benedikt, Christian Thöni, und Simon Gächter. 2008. Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319:1362–1367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Hirschman, Albert O. 1977. The passions and the interests: Political arguments for capitalism before its triumph. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  33. IG Metall NRW. 2007. Interview. Düsseldorf. (04.01.2007, 10:00–12:00).Google Scholar
  34. Kahan, Dan M. 2005. The logic of reciprocity: Trust, collective action, and law. In Moral sentiments and material interests. The foundations of cooperation in economic life, Hrsg. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert T. Boyd, und Ernst Fehr, 339–378. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  35. Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, und Richard H. Thaler. 1986. Fairness and the assumptions of economics. The Journal of Business 59:285–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Lijphard, Arend. 1975. The comparable-cases strategy in comparative research. Comparative Political Studies 8:168–177.Google Scholar
  37. Metall NRW. 2007. Interview. Düsseldorf. (04.04.2007, 14:00–16:30).Google Scholar
  38. Milgram, Stanley. 1963. Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67:371–378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Milgram, Stanley. 1974. Obedience to authority. An experimental view. New York: Harper.Google Scholar
  40. Müller. 1. Interview. (02.05.2007, 15:30–16:30).Google Scholar
  41. Müller. 2. Interview. (08.02.2007, 12:00–14:00).Google Scholar
  42. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action, the political economy of institutions and decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  43. Ostrom, Elinor. 2005. Policies that crowd out reciprocity and collective action. In Moral sentiments and material interests. The foundations of cooperation in economic life, Hrsg. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert T. Boyd, und Ernst Fehr, 253–275. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  44. Parsons, Talcott. 1937. The structure of social action. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
  45. Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The great transformation. New York: Farrar & Rinehart.Google Scholar
  46. Schütz, Alfred. 1932. Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie. Wien: Springer.Google Scholar
  47. Schütz, Alfred. 1971. Gesammelte Aufsätze I. Das Problem der sozialen Wirklichkeit. Den Haag: Nijhoff.Google Scholar
  48. Steche 1. Interview. (24.01.2008, 10:00–11:00).Google Scholar
  49. Steche 2. Interview. (16.05.2008, 9:00–11:00).Google Scholar
  50. Steche 3. Interview. (08.10.2007, 14:00–17:00).Google Scholar
  51. Strauss, Anselm L., und Juliet Corbin. 1990. Basics of qualitative research. Grounded theory procedures and techniques. Newbury Park: Sage.Google Scholar
  52. Streeck, Wolfgang. 2010. Does ‘Behavioural Economics’ offer an alternative to the neoclassical paradigm? Socio-Economic Review 8:387–397.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Swedberg, Richard. 2005. Interest. New York: Open University Press.Google Scholar
  54. Tehnwolder 1. Interview. (20.05.2008, 12:30–14:00).Google Scholar
  55. Tehnwolder 2. Interview. (25.01.2008, 14:00–15:30).Google Scholar
  56. Thaler, Richard H. 1992. The winner’s curse. Paradoxes and anomalies of economic life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  57. Titmuss, Richard M. 1971. The gift relationship. From human blood to social policy. New York: Pantheon Books.Google Scholar
  58. Weber, Max. 1978. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (1920). 7. Aufl. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.Google Scholar
  59. Weber, Max. 1988. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I (1920). 9. Aufl. Tübingen: UTB.Google Scholar
  60. Williamson, Oliver. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
  61. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  62. Wolder 1. Interview. (04.04.2008, 11:00–13:00).Google Scholar
  63. Wolder 2. Interview. (06.05.2008, 13:30–17:00).Google Scholar
  64. Wolder/Tehnwolder 1. Interview. (10.01.2008, 11:45–13:00).Google Scholar
  65. Wolder/Tehnwolder 2. Interview. (10.01.2008, 9:00–10:30).Google Scholar
  66. Wrong, Dennis. 1961. The oversocialized conception of man in modern sociology. American Sociological Review 26:183–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  67. Zelizer, Viviana. 1978. Human values and the market: The case of life insurance and death in 19th century America. American Journal of Sociology 84:591–610.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  68. Zelizer, Viviana. 1979. Morals and markets: The development of life insurance in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  69. Zelizer, Viviana. 1981. The price and value of children: The case of children’s insurance in the United States. American Journal of Sociology 86:1036–1056.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  70. Zelizer, Viviana. 1985. Pricing the priceless child: The changing social value of children. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
  71. Zelizer, Viviana. 2007. Ethics in the economy. Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik 8:8–23.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Max-Planck-Institut für GesellschaftsforschungKölnDeutschland

Personalised recommendations