Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft

, Volume 82, Issue 1, pp 5–28 | Cite as

Vergütung von Managern deutscher Aktienfonds

Höhe, Struktur, Determinanten und Anreizwirkungen
Forschung

Zusammenfassung

In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir Höhe und Struktur der Vergütung von Fondsmanagern und erklären diese durch Eigenschaften des Arbeitnehmers, des Arbeitgebers und des Arbeitsplatzes. Die Vergütungshöhe hängt primär von der Bedeutung des Arbeitsplatzes im Unternehmen ab, die Vergütungsstruktur dagegen in erster Linie von Eigenschaften des Fondsmanagers und der Fondsgesellschaft. Fondsgesellschaften motivieren ihre Manager vornehmlich durch hohe Boni in guten Jahren, nicht durch Bestrafung in schlechten Jahren. Dem aus dieser Asymmetrie resultierenden Anreiz zu hohen Anlagerisiken wirken Fondsgesellschaften durch Einschränkung der Handlungsspielräume der Manager entgegen. Dennoch können sie dadurch nicht verhindern, dass Fondsmanager mit konvexen Bonusstrukturen Risiken eingehen, die möglicherweise den Anlegerinteressen entgegenlaufen.

Schlüsselwörter

Vergütungsdeterminanten Festgehalt Bonuszahlungen Fondsmanager Anreize 

Compensation of German mutual fund managers

Level, structure, determinants, and consequences

Abstract

We analyze the level and the structure of fund managers’ compensation and show that both are determined by characteristics of the fund manager, the fund management company, and the job environment. We find that the compensation level primarily depends on the importance of the manager for the fund company whereas the compensation structure is mainly determined by characteristics of the fund manager and the fund company. Furthermore, we show that fund companies motivate their employees through asymmetric compensation schemes by increasing bonuses in good years and reducing them to a much smaller extent in bad years. They try to mitigate the risk-taking behavior induced by these compensation schemes via risk limits but are not successful in doing so: We document strong tournament behavior of fund managers with convex incentive structures.

Keywords

Fixed salary Bonus Compensation determinants Fund manager Incentives 

JEL Classification

G23 J31 J33 

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Copyright information

© Gabler Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Seminar für FinanzierungslehreUniversität zu KölnKölnDeutschland

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