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Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft

, Volume 79, Issue 7, pp 929–954 | Cite as

Hierarchie und Entlohnung

  • André Casajus
  • Tobias Hiller
  • Harald Wiese
Forschung

Zusammenfassung

Im Aufsatz wird ein Entlohnungsschema entwickelt, das die hierarchische Struktur eines Unternehmens berücksichtigt. Dabei wird die kooperative Spieltheorie genutzt und der Ansatz von van den Brink (2008) modifiziert. Neben Aussagen über die Wirkung der Hierarchie auf vertikale Lohndifferenzen zwischen den Hierarchieebenen können auch Schlüsse hinsichtlich der Allokation der Mitarbeiter auf die einzelnen Ebenen gezogen werden.

Schlüsselwörter

Hierarchie Entlohnung Shapley-Lösung kooperative Spieltheorie vertikale Lohndifferenzen 

Hierarchy and wages

Abstract

In this paper, we suggest a wage scheme that accounts for the hierarchical structure of an enterprise. We employ concepts of cooperative game theory and modify the van den Brink (2008) approach. Besides results on how the hierarchy affects wage differentials between levels of the hierarchy, we deal with the allocation of employees to the different levels.

Keywords

Hierarchy Wage schemes Shapley solution Cooperative game theory Vertical wage differentials 

JEL-Classification

C71 J31 M51 M52 

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Copyright information

© Gabler Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsinformatik des E-BusinessHandelshochschule LeipzigLeipzigDeutschland
  2. 2.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche FakultätUniversität LeipzigLeipzigDeutschland

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