Criminal Law and Philosophy

, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp 605–616 | Cite as

Doing Without Desert

  • Victor TadrosEmail author
Original Paper


This paper examines Derk Pereboom’s argument against punishment on deterrent grounds in his recent book Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. It suggests that Pereboom’s argument against basic desert has not been shown to extend to the view that those who act wrongly lose rights against punishment for deterrent reasons. It further supports the view that those who act wrongly, if they fulfil compatibilist conditions of responsibility, do lose rights to avert threats they pose. And this, it is argued, supports punishment on deterrent grounds, at least in some limited cases.


Pereboom Punishment Desert Retributivism Deterrence Using Intentions Wrongdoing Duties 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of LawUniversity of WarwickCoventryUK

Personalised recommendations