Criminal Law and Philosophy

, Volume 9, Issue 4, pp 753–770 | Cite as

Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck

Book Review

Abstract

I offer a brief review of, and critical response to, Neil Levy’s fascinating recent book Hard Luck, where he argues that no one is ever free or morally responsible not because of determinism or indeterminism, but because of luck. Two of Levy’s central arguments in defending his free will nihilism concern the nature and role of explanation in a theory of moral responsibility and the nature of akrasia. With respect to explanation, Levy argues that an adequate theory of moral responsibility must be able provide contrastive explanations of why an agent performs one action rather than another, and that libertarians lack the resources to provide such explanations. With respect to akrasia, Levy argues that it is impossible to be directly morally responsible for akratic actions. In response I argue that any sense of contrastive explanation that can reasonably be thought to be a requirement on an adequate theory of moral responsibility is a sense that agent-causal libertarians can secure. I then argue that the agent-causal theory of free will offers an alternative and attractive understanding of motivation and self-control (than offered by Levy) that makes it plausible to think that we can be morally responsible for akratic actions.

Keywords

Free will Moral responsibility Libertarianism Luck Explanation Akrasia 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyMarymount UniversityArlingtonUSA

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