The Review of International Organizations

, Volume 12, Issue 4, pp 647–651 | Cite as

Barbara Koremenos. 2016. The continent of international law. Explaining agreement design. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

  • Oliver WesterwinterEmail author
Book Review

Barbara Koremenos presents an important book that opens up new frontiers in the study of international cooperation and the design of international institutions. It is characterized by theoretical and empirical richness as well as analytical rigor. All students of international cooperation will have to engage with its insights and implications. Building on the theoretical framework of the seminal legalization and rational design projects (Goldstein et al. 2000; Koremenos et al. 2001), the central idea of The Continent of International Lawis that the formal design details of international agreements matter for international cooperation and that states meticulously craft the specificities of international agreements to bring them in line with the problems they seek to govern. States’ strategic design choices are driven by the cooperation problems that they face when attempting to cooperate at the international level as well as by the characteristics of the states interested in...


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of St. GallenSt. GallenSwitzerland

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