The Review of International Organizations

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 29–40

The coordinate plane of global governance

Article

Abstract

The ‘coordinate plane of global governance’ developed in this paper describes the trade-off between static gains and dynamic losses associated with international policy harmonization. A simple model illustrates how potential gains result from producing positive international spill-overs, whereas potential losses come from restricted systems competition between national policy regimes. The solution to this model allows identifying the cut-off level between policies suitable for global harmonization and policies which should better not be centralized. An application of the concept to selected policy fields illustrates its relevance for decision-making on global governance.

Keywords

Policy harmonization International policy coordination Policy innovation 

JEL codes

F02 F42 H87 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Kiel Institute for the World EconomyKielGermany
  2. 2.Faculty of Business and EconomicsRWTH Aachen UniversityAachenGermany

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