Acting in ignorance

Research Article


This paper considers and rejects the arguments that have been given in favour of the view that one can only act for the reason that p if one knows that p. The paper contrasts it with the view I hold, which is that one can act for the reason that p even if it is not the case that p.


knowledge reasons action non-factive explanation 


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Copyright information

© Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ReadingReadingUK
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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