Acting in ignorance
- 78 Downloads
This paper considers and rejects the arguments that have been given in favour of the view that one can only act for the reason that p if one knows that p. The paper contrasts it with the view I hold, which is that one can act for the reason that p even if it is not the case that p.
Keywordsknowledge reasons action non-factive explanation
- Hornsby, J. (2008). “A Disjunctive Theory of Acting for Reasons,” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, eds. by F. Macpherson and A. Haddock. Oxford/New York: Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar
- Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson’s University LibraryGoogle Scholar
- Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar
- Williams, B. A. O. (1981). “Internal and External Reasons,” reprinted in his Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar