Frontiers of Mathematics in China

, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp 839–856 | Cite as

Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games with local interaction and best-response dynamics

Research Article
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Abstract

This paper studies the long run behavior in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games. All players are assumed to sit around a circle and to interact only with their neighbors. It is known that full-defection is the unique long run equilibrium as the probability of players’ experimentation (or mutation) tends to zero in the best response dynamics. Here, it is shown that full-cooperation could emerge in the long run if one also cares for his neighbors in the best-response dynamics.

Keywords

Prisoner’s dilemma game full cooperation best response local interaction long run equilibrium parallel updating 

MSC

91A22 60J20 
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Copyright information

© Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of MathematicsAcademia SinicaTaipei, TaiwanChina

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