Real-time state recovery attack against MORUS in nonce-misuse setting

  • Tairong ShiEmail author
  • Jie Guan



This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61572516, 61602514, 61272041, 61272488).


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Copyright information

© Science China Press and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Information Science and Technology InstituteZhengzhouChina

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