Science China Information Sciences

, Volume 55, Issue 11, pp 2555–2569 | Cite as

Evolutionary ciphers against differential power analysis and differential fault analysis

  • Ming TangEmail author
  • ZhenLong Qiu
  • Min Yang
  • PingPan Cheng
  • Si Gao
  • ShuBo Liu
  • QinShu Meng
Research Paper


Side channel analysis(SCA) focuses on attacking cryptographic algorithm implementations by collecting leaked information and analyzing the correlation between the leaked and key information in the cryptographic system. Currently, SCA is the main threat to cryptographic implementations, with DPA (differential power analysis) and DFA (differential fault analysis) being two of the most threatening types of SCA. However, the existing countermeasures against DPA and DFA have shortcomings and can hardly protect cipher designs perfectly. Based on a comprehensive analysis of DPA and DFA, this paper proposes a new idea of using an evolutionary cipher (EVOC) against DPAs based on the model proposed by Kocher, and several different new types of DFAs. In fact, an EVOC is a kind of dynamic cipher designing method. Moreover, combined with intelligent searching algorithms and cryptography design policies, EVOCs utilize the dynamic and unpredictable properties of TRNG (a truly random number generator) to ensure cipher design at a high level of security. Therefore, with an EVOC we could design cryptography algorithms with high security to resist mathematical analysis as well as DPAs and DFAs. This paper analyzes and proves the security, efficiency, cost, and original features of EVOCs against DPA and DFA both theoretically and experimentally. Compared with existing countermeasures against SCAs, EVOCs use dynamic non-linear operations to destroy the bases of DPA and DFA. At the algorithm level, EVOCs are more efficient than other resistance methods. Based on the theory and experiments, this paper proposes certain modifications to the EVOC in the AES (advanced encryption standard) algorithm, which can be referenced by other dynamic designs of cryptographic algorithms.


evolutionary cipher DPA countermeasure DPA DFA countermeasure DFA SCA 


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Copyright information

© Science China Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ming Tang
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • ZhenLong Qiu
    • 2
  • Min Yang
    • 3
  • PingPan Cheng
    • 2
  • Si Gao
    • 2
  • ShuBo Liu
    • 1
    • 2
  • QinShu Meng
    • 2
  1. 1.State Key Lab. of AIS & TC, Ministry of EducationWuhan UniversityWuhanChina
  2. 2.School of ComputersWuhan UniversityWuhanChina
  3. 3.International School of SoftwareWuhan UniversityWuhanChina

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