Science China Information Sciences

, Volume 53, Issue 3, pp 454–464 | Cite as

A property-based attestation protocol for TCM

Research Papers


This paper presents a property attestation protocol for the security chip TCM (trusted cryptographic module) via analyzing the problems of the current property attestation, which is built on the property attestation model with the online trust third party. In the protocol the prover utilizes the zero-knowledge proof by the attribute certificates, configuration commitment and TCM signature, and attests its configuration and status which are compliant with the declarative security property. The protocol is characterized by shorter signature length and lower computations. The security of the protocol is proved at the random oracle model. The protocol can help extend application and improve standard for security chip TCM, and it also has practical value and immediate significance.


trust computing trust cryptographic module (TCM) property attestation signature of knowledge configuration commitment 


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Copyright information

© Science in China Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of SoftwareChinese Academy of ScienceBeijingChina
  2. 2.National Engineering Research Center of Information SecurityBeijingChina

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