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Universally composable anonymous Hash certification model

  • Zhang Fan Email author
  • Ma JianFeng 
  • SangJae Moon
Article

Abstract

Ideal function is the fundamental component in the universally composable security model. However, the certification ideal function defined in the universally composable security model realizes the identity authentication by binding identity to messages and the signature, which fails to characterize the special security requirements of anonymous authentication with other kind of certificate. Therefore, inspired by the work of Marten, an anonymous hash certification ideal function and a more universal certificate CA model are proposed in this paper. We define the security requirements and security notions for this model in the framework of universal composable security and prove in the plain model (not in the random-oracle model) that these security notions can be achieved using combinations of a secure digital signature scheme, a symmetrical encryption mechanism, a family of pseudorandom functions, and a family of one-way collision-free hash functions. Considering the limitation of wireless environment and computation ability of wireless devices, this anonymous Hash certification ideal function is realized by using symmetry primitives.

Keywords

anonymous authentication Hash universal composable security 

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Copyright information

© Science in China Press 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Key Laboratory, of Computer Network and Information Security (Ministry of Education)Xidian UniversityXi’anChina
  2. 2.Mobile Network Security Technology Research CenterKyungpook National UniversityDaeyuKorea

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