Journal of Systems Science and Complexity

, Volume 31, Issue 6, pp 1571–1590 | Cite as

Which Inspection Approach Is Better to Prevent Drug Fraud: Announced or Unannounced?

  • Manman ZhangEmail author
  • Juliang Zhang
  • T.C.E. Cheng
  • Jose Maria Sallan
  • Guowei Hua


In recent years, there are many crimes related drug fraud occuring in China and many experts think that the main cause is that China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) adopts announced inspection (AI). In order to circumvent this difficulty, CFDA has exploited unannounced inspection (UI) since 2014. In this paper, the authors study the problem of which one performs better, AI or UI. Specifically, the authors consider a supervisor, which decides the inspection approach, inspection strength and punishment to force the firm to put self-inspection effort to meet the requirements of Good Manufacturing Practice, and a firm, which produces a drug and decides its self-inspection effort. The authors use game theory to model this problem, characterize the equilibrium policies under AI, and compare the effects of the two approaches on preventing drug fraud under complete and incomplete information. The results show that under the complete information, UI performs better if the firm’s technical level and the inspection cost are low and AI performs better otherwise. When the supervisor doesn’t know the firm’s technical level, if the low technical level is high, AI performs better. Otherwise, UI performs better if the inspection cost is low and AI performs better if the inspection cost is high.


Drug inspection game theory healthcare incomplete information public policy 


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Copyright information

© Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manman Zhang
    • 1
    Email author
  • Juliang Zhang
    • 1
  • T.C.E. Cheng
    • 2
  • Jose Maria Sallan
    • 3
  • Guowei Hua
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Logistics Management, School of Economics and ManagementBeijing Jiaotong UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.Department of Logistics and Maritime StudiesThe Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, KowloonHong KongChina
  3. 3.Department d’Organizacio d’EmpresesUniversitat Politècnica de CatalunyaTerrassaSpain

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