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Financial Markets and Portfolio Management

, Volume 32, Issue 2, pp 115–142 | Cite as

Hedge fund incentives, management commitment and survivorship

  • Judy Qiu
  • Leilei Tang
  • Ingo WalterEmail author
Article
  • 158 Downloads

Abstract

Management ownership in hedge funds sends conflicting signals—signals which reduce investors’ perception of survivorship risk. We document that decisions on management ownership are purposely self-selected. Such decisions are most likely motivated by unique incentive mechanisms imbedded in hedge funds. We examine the impact of managerial ownership decisions on fund survivorship risk by accounting for unobserved fund manager motivations that affect both ownership decisions and survivorship risk. Our findings suggest that the conventional argument that having management commitment can reduce survival risk (and therefore align the interests between managers and investors) is significantly overstated. These results are robust to using alternative ownership measures and controlling for different samples.

Keywords

Hedge fund incentive Endogeneity Management ownership Survivorship risk 

JEL Classification

C34 G23 G32 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Stephen Brown, Helen Bollaert, Simba Chang, Eric Debodt, Giuseppe DeFeo, Joseph Fan, William Greene, Paul Healy, Jens Jackwerth, Stan Panis, Markus Schmid, Armin Schwienbacher and David Yermack, as well as seminar participants at the University of Western Australia, University of Queensland, Curtin University and SKEMA (Lille, France), for helpful discussions and comments. We are also grateful to Mila Getmansky for providing us with the return smoothing code. We are responsible for all errors.

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Copyright information

© Swiss Society for Financial Market Research 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Business SchoolUniversity of Western AustraliaCrawleyAustralia
  2. 2.Business SchoolUniversity of StrathclydeGlasgowUK
  3. 3.Stern Business SchoolNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA

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