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Financial Markets and Portfolio Management

, Volume 31, Issue 3, pp 393–395 | Cite as

Ira M. Millstein: The activist director—lessons from the boardroom and the future of the corporation

Columbia University Press, 2017, 219 pages, ISBN 978-0-231-18134-1, USD 27.95, approx. EUR 25
  • Felix von MeyerinckEmail author
Book Review
  • 112 Downloads

Boards of directors are the central decision-making body of most organizations. Therefore, ensuring the proper functioning of this central corporate governance institution is a key issue for society at large. Yet, we know little about the inner workings of boards as the content of board meetings is usually confidential.1 Millstein’s book helps fill this void by analyzing how boards have acted in actual situations where the well-being of the organization is at stake. Thus, at first sight, the book seems like a collection of narratives from the author’s life. What makes it special is that these case studies retell real-world boardroom situations experienced firsthand by the author, a leading expert on corporate governance, while counseling directors and CEOs of large publicly listed companies, including General Motors and Drexel Burnham Lambert, as well as public utility companies, government authorities, and NGOs.

Millstein’s key message is that good governance cannot ensure improved...

References

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Copyright information

© Swiss Society for Financial Market Research 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance (s/bf) of the University of St. GallenSt. GallenSwitzerland

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