Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences?
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Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length bank lending. We show that such heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to a lower probability of inefficient credit foreclosure than both monopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank financing. Yet, in order to reduce hold-up and coordination-failure risk, the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt must not become too large. For firms with intermediate expected profits, the probability of inefficient credit-renegotiation is shown to decrease along with the relationship bank’s information precision. For firms with extremely high or extremely low expected returns, however, it increases.
KeywordsRelationship lending Asymmetric information Financial distress Hold-up Coordination failure
JELD82 G21 L14
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