Financial Markets and Portfolio Management

, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 43–75 | Cite as

Performance Schweizerischer Verwaltungsräte anhand der Aktienkursentwicklung

  • Manuel Ammann
  • Daniel Matti
  • Rico von Wyss
Article

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Literatur

  1. BALIGA, R., C. MOYER und R. RAO (1996): „CEO Duality and Firm Performance: What's the Fuss?“, Strategic Management Journal, S. 41–53.Google Scholar
  2. BAYSINGER, R. und H. BUTLER (1985): „Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition“, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, S. 101–124.Google Scholar
  3. BRICKLEY, J., J. COLES und G. JARREL (1997): „Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board“, Journal of Corporate Finance, S. 189–220.Google Scholar
  4. BURT, R. (1983): „Corporate Profits and Cooptation: Network of Market Constraint and Directorate Ties in the American Economy“, New York: Academic Press.Google Scholar
  5. CARRINGTON, P. (1981): „Horizontal Co-optation through Corporate Interlocks“, Dissertation, University of Toronto.Google Scholar
  6. DAHYA, J. und N. TRAVLOS (2000): „Does the One Man Show Pay? Theory and Evidence on the Dual CEO Revisited“, European Financial Management, S. 85–98.Google Scholar
  7. DEMB, A. und F. NEUBAUER (1992): „The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes“, Long Range Planning, S. 9–20.Google Scholar
  8. DONALDSON, L. (1990): „The Ethereal Hand: Organizational Economics and Management Theory“, Academy of Management Review, S. 369–381.Google Scholar
  9. DOWEN, R. (1995): „Board of Director Quality and Firm Performance“, International Journal of the Economics of Business, S. 123–132.Google Scholar
  10. DRUMMEN, M. und H. ZIMMERMANN (1992): „The Structure of European Stock Returns“, Financial Analysts Journal, July–August, S. 15–26.Google Scholar
  11. EISENBERG, T., S. SUNDGREN und M. WELLS (1998): „Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms“, Journal of Financial Economics, S. 35–54.Google Scholar
  12. FLIGSTEIN, N. und P. BRANTLEY (1992): „Bank Control, Owner Control or Organizational Dynamics: Who Controls the Large Modern Corporation?“, American Journal of Sociology, S. 280–307.Google Scholar
  13. GRÜNBICHLER, A. und P. OERTMANN (1995): „Corporate Governance: Schweizer Erfahrungen“ Working Paper, Universität St. Gallen.Google Scholar
  14. HERMALIN, B. und M. WEISBACH (1991): „The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance“ Financial Management, S. 101–112.Google Scholar
  15. JENSEN, M. (1968): „The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945–1964“, Journal of Finance, S. 389–416.Google Scholar
  16. JENSEN, M. (1993): „The Modern Industrial Revolution and Failure of Internal Control Systems“, Journal of Finance, S. 389–416.Google Scholar
  17. JOBSON, J. und B. KORKIE (1981): „Performance Hypothesis Testing with the Sharpe and Treynor Measures“, Journal of Finance, S. 889–908.Google Scholar
  18. JOHNSON, J., C. DAILY und A. ELLSTRAND (1996): „Boards of Directors: A Review and Reasearch Agenda“, Journal of Management, S. 409–438.Google Scholar
  19. JUDGE, W. und C. ZEITHAML (1992): „Institutional and Strategic Choice Perspectives on Board Involvement in the Strategic Decision Process“, Academy of Management Journal, S. 766–794.Google Scholar
  20. KANJI, G.K. (1999): „100 Statistical Tests“, London: SAGE.Google Scholar
  21. LORSCH, J. und E. MACIVER (1989): „Pawns of Potentates: The Reality of America's Corporate Boards“, Harvard Business School Press, Boston.Google Scholar
  22. MACE, M. (1971): „Directors: Myth and Reality“, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.Google Scholar
  23. MIZRUCHI, M. (1996): „What do Interlocks do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates“, Annual Review of Sociology, S. 271–298.Google Scholar
  24. o. V. (o. J.): „Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht“, SR 220.Google Scholar
  25. o. V. (1991–2000): „Verzeichnis der Verwaltungsräte“, Zürich: Orell Füssli Verlag.Google Scholar
  26. o. V. (2002): “Rating der Verwaltungsräte 2002”, Leadership, Knight Gianella & Partner AG, S. 6–9.Google Scholar
  27. o. V. (2002): „SPI Titel per Ende 2001“, Schweizer Börse, www.swx.com.Google Scholar
  28. PALMON, O. und J. WALD (2002): „Are Two Heads Better than One? The Impact of Changes in Management Structure on Performancer by Firm Size“, Journal of Coporate Finance, S. 213–226.Google Scholar
  29. PENNINGS, J. (1980): „Interlocking Directorates“, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.Google Scholar
  30. PFANNSCHMIDT, A. (1993): „Personelle Verflechtungen über Aufsichtsräte“, Wiesbaden: Gabler.Google Scholar
  31. PFEFFER, J. und G. SALANCIK (1978): „The External Control of Organizations — A Resource Dependence Perspective“, New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
  32. RECHNER, P. und D. DALTON (1991): „CEO Duality and Organizational Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis“, Strategic Management Journal, S. 155–160.Google Scholar
  33. ROSENSTEIN, J., A. V. BRUNO, W. D. BYGRAVE und N. T. TAYLOR (1993): „The CEO, Venture Capitalists, and the Board“, Journal of Business Venturing, S. 99–113.Google Scholar
  34. ROSENSTEIN, S. und J. WYATT (2001): „Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth“, Journal of Fiancial Economics, S. 175–191.Google Scholar
  35. SCHAFFER, B. (2002): „Board Assessments of Managerial Performance“, Journal of Managerial Psychology, S. 95–115.Google Scholar
  36. SCHWARZ, G. (2001): „Filz, Kontrolle und Verantwortung“, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24.3.2001, S. 21.Google Scholar
  37. SHARPE, W. (1966): „Mutual Fund Performace“, Journal of Business, S. 119–138.Google Scholar
  38. TREYNOR, J. und F. BLACK (1973): “How to Use Security Analysis to Improve Portfolio Selsection”, Journal of Business, S. 66–86.Google Scholar
  39. WEIBEL, P. (1998): „Strategieentwicklung und-durchsetzung“, in: S. Biland und M. Hilber (Hrsg.): Verwaltungsrat als Gestaltungsrat, Zürich: WEKA Verlag, S. 103–112.Google Scholar
  40. YERMACK, D. (1996): „Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors“, Journal of Financial Economics, S. 185–211.Google Scholar
  41. ZAJAC, E. (1988): „Interlocking Directorates as an Interorganizational Strategy: A Test of Critical Assumptions“, Academy of Management Journal, S. 428–238.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Swiss Society for Financial Market Research 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manuel Ammann
    • 1
  • Daniel Matti
    • 1
  • Rico von Wyss
    • 1
  1. 1.Schweizerisches Institut für Banken und FinanzenUniversität St. GallenSt. Gallen

Personalised recommendations