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Philosophia

pp 1–8 | Cite as

On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman

  • C. E. AbbateEmail author
Article

Abstract

Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman (2017). What explains this alleged puzzle? Harman (2017) leaves this an open question. In this article, a solution is offered.

Keywords

Blame Moral ignorance Consequentialism 

Notes

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Nevada, Las VegasLas VegasUSA

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