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Philosophia

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Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (Eds.), 2018, Epistemic Consequentialism

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 335 pages, $77.00
  • Peter Hartl
Article

Although “epistemic consequentialism” is a relatively new term, it refers to a general approach in epistemology which has its roots in early process reliabilism championed by Goldman in his seminal paper, ‘What is Justified Belief?’ (Goldman 1979). In recent years, an increasing number of epistemologists have reinforced the core idea of process reliabilism and argued that epistemic norms are correct insofar as following them produces epistemically good consequences (which is, typically, true belief). According to epistemic consequentialism, normative terms like “justification” or “rationality” are understood in terms of the conduciveness of epistemic good. Just like consequentialists in ethics, epistemic consequentialists evaluate belief-forming practices (acceptance, suspension of judgement and disbelief) in accordance with how effective they are in producing epistemically good consequences.

Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn’s edited book, Epistemic Consequentialism, is arguably the first...

Notes

Acknowledgements

This review contributes to the research programme of the MTA - BTK - Lendület ‘Morals and Science’ Research Group. My research was supported by the MTA - BTK - Lendület ‘Morals and Science’ Research Project. I am also grateful to Oxford University Press for delivering a copy of the book.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Hartl
    • 1
  1. 1.Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of Philosophy, Budapest, MTA – BTK – Lendület Morals and Science Research GroupBudapestHungary

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