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Philosophia

pp 1–6 | Cite as

Resisting Scientific Realism, by K. Brad Wray

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2018, Pp. xii + 224
  • Elay ShechEmail author
Book Review

Science is our most successful epistemic enterprise. Realism about science tends to hold that the success of science is not miraculous and, indeed, it is best explained by the fact that mature scientific theories are true or approximately true. Such claims extend beyond observable phenomena to include the realm of unobservable entities and processes postulated by our best theories. However, in Resisting Scientific Realism, K. Brad Wray defends an anti-realist position, which holds that radical theory change is part and parcel of the scientific enterprise so that “our current best theories are quite likely going to be replaced in the future by theories that make significantly different ontological assumptions” (1). Metaphysically speaking, Wray’s anti-realism differs from realism in the sense that he does not believe that the epistemic success of mature scientific theory warrants ontological commitment to the unobservable entities and processes postulated by such theory. In the...

Notes

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyAuburn UniversityAuburnUSA

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