pp 1–15 | Cite as

Foot Without Achilles’ Heel

  • Ulf HlobilEmail author
  • Katharina Nieswandt


It is often assumed that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics postulates an obligation to be a good human being and that it derives further obligations from this idea. The paper argues that this assumption is false, at least for Philippa Foot’s view. Our argument blocks a widespread objection to Foot’s view, and it shows how virtue ethics in general can neutralize such worries.


Virtue ethics Flourishing Rationality Moral skepticism Human nature 



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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyConcordia UniversityMontrealCanada

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