Foot Without Achilles’ Heel
It is often assumed that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics postulates an obligation to be a good human being and that it derives further obligations from this idea. The paper argues that this assumption is false, at least for Philippa Foot’s view. Our argument blocks a widespread objection to Foot’s view, and it shows how virtue ethics in general can neutralize such worries.
KeywordsVirtue ethics Flourishing Rationality Moral skepticism Human nature
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