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Belonging as a Social and Institutional Fact

  • Jovan BabićEmail author


The first issue raised in the paper is difference between social and institutional facts; both exist only because we believe they are real. Second is the claim that belonging to collectives is always a social fact, not necessarily as a result of any decision-making process; it might also become institutional through actual, sometimes only implicit, acceptance of some constitutive rules (which necessarily includes decision-making). Third, accepting constitutive rules functions by setting an irreversible point in time after which the scope of available justificatory reasons for deciding and doing narrows. The implication is that reality of collectives cannot be reduced to individuals. Individuals often participate in this reality by belonging. Belonging thus becomes a social and sometimes also an institutional fact.


Belonging Social fact Institutional fact Constitutive and regulative rules Irreversibility 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Belgrade – Faculty of ArtsBelgradeSerbia

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