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Philosophia

pp 1–4 | Cite as

The Kind ‘Object’

  • Johan GamperEmail author
Article

Abstract

On the recently suggested loophole view of causal closure, nothing in a universe has its cause coming from another universe. It is allowed, though, that something, especially a first thing, can have its cause situated in an interface between universes. However, the possibility of such an interface does not mean that there is any actual interface. In fact, there are several major obstacles to be managed before an interface should be hoped for. One such obstacle, the need for an account of how objects in one universe relate to objects in another universe, is addressed in this paper. The outcome is positive and suggests that objects of different ontological status relate as the kind ‘object’. Some positive and negative properties of such higher-order objects are noted.

Keywords

Substance dualism Causal closure Philosophy of physics Philosophy of mind Dualism 

Reference

  1. Gamper, J. (2017). Philosophia, 45, 631–636.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9791-y.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Scientific OntologySubrosa KBVendelsöSweden

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