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Philosophia

, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp 1023–1042 | Cite as

Assertability Conditions and the Investigations

  • Nicoletta BartunekEmail author
Article

Abstract

Later Wittgenstein is famous for having related meaning and use. Nonetheless, thanks to Dummett and Kripke, and the debates they provoked, a conventional wisdom is nowadays available: Wittgenstein, so the story goes, adopted a theory of meaning in terms of assertability conditions. This paper claims that it is wrong to attribute such a theory to the Investigations. For such a thesis to go through, one of the following two scenarios should be confirmed. It should either be true that Wittgenstein reduces all meaning-engendering uses and conditions of use to assertion and assertability conditions, or that he invokes assertability conditions to show that meaning is always use. But, I will be claiming, the first scenario is excluded by Wittgenstein’s thoughts about the role of assertion and his thoughts about the sense-force distinction, while the second scenario is excluded by Wittgenstein’s thoughts about truth.

Keywords

Wittgenstein Philosophical investigations Assertability conditions Dummett Kripke 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Diego Marconi, Matteo Nascé and Purdel Răzvan for all their help and support. I have benefited greatly from their attentive reading and subsequent discussions of my drafts. I am also thankful to the two anonymous reviewers of this paper whose suggestions helped improve and clarify this manuscript.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Educational SciencesUniversity of TurinTurinItaly

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