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Philosophia

, Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 131–139 | Cite as

Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture

  • Paul HenneEmail author
  • Jennifer SemlerEmail author
  • Vladimir Chituc
  • Felipe De Brigard
  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Article

Abstract

Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In light of recent empirical evidence, however, some skeptics conclude that philosophers should stop assuming the principle unconditionally. Streumer, however, does not simply assume the principle’s truth; he provides arguments for it. In this article, we argue that his arguments fail to support the claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.

Keywords

Ought implies can Obligation Ought Blame Ability 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We are thankful to the members of MAD Lab and the IMC Lab at Duke University. We are also thankful for the comments of an anonymous reviewer at Philosophia.

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyDuke UniversityDurhamUSA
  2. 2.Duke UniversityDurhamUSA

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