, Volume 44, Issue 4, pp 1419–1438 | Cite as

The Methodology of Philosophical Practice: Eclecticism and/or Integrativeness?

  • Aleksandar Fatić
  • Ivana Zagorac


The need for philosophical practice to integrate various methods, both conceptual and those based on the use of emotions, raises the question as to whether its methodology is necessarily eclectic, in terms of the collection of various methodologies used in philosophy, or whether there is a way to move beyond eclecticism. This is the main subject of this paper. In other words, the question is whether there is such a thing as an ‘integrative’ methodology and, if so, what distinguishes such a method from mere eclecticism. In this text, we define the methodological procedure of integrativeness as the process of systematizing perspectives into an orientational answer to the demands of a specific problem. What differentiates such an approach from mere summation is a new contribution that results from a synergistic and systematic meeting of positions and argumentations whose final result differs from its initial elements. Diversity in the form of a multidimensional relationship towards life and the world results in numerous perspectives, which is a value that should be cultivated and integrated into a reflective and actional perception of the world.


Philosophical practice Methodology Eclecticism Pluri-perspectivism Integrativeness 



A part of this research was supported under Marie Curie Newfelpro funding scheme (CONVINce-ME project, FP7-PEOPLE-2011-COFUND program; Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport). The project was hosted by the Institute for Medical Ethics and History of Medicine, Ruhr University Bochum. The research for the article also arises from Project no. 179049 (“Policies of Remembrance and National Identity: The Regional and European Context”) funded by the Serbian Ministry of Education and Research, which is implemented by the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, 2010–2015.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Aleksandar Fatić, Institute for Philosophy and Social TheoryUniversity of BelgradeBelgradeSerbia
  2. 2.Ivana Zagorac, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social SciencesUniversity of ZagrebZagrebCroatia
  3. 3.Institute for Medical Ethics and History of MedicineRuhr University BochumBochumGermany

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