Philosophia

pp 1–21 | Cite as

The Case of the Disappearing Semicolon: Expressive-Assertivism and the Embedding Problem

Article
First Online:
Received:
Accepted:
  • 93 Downloads

Abstract

Expressive-Assertivism, a metaethical theory championed by Daniel Boisvert, is sometimes considered to be a particularly promising form of hybrid expressivism. One of the main virtues of Expressive-Assertivism is that it seems to offer a simple solution to the Frege-Geach problem. I argue, in contrast, that Expressive-Assertivism faces much the same challenges as pure expressivism.

Keywords

Metaethics Embedding problem Frege-Geach problem Hybrid expressivism Ecumenical expressivism 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Anderson, L., & Lepore, E. (2013). Slurring words. Noûs, 47, 25–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bar-On, D., & Chrisman, M. (2009). Ethical neo-expressivism. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics (Vol. 4, pp. 133–165). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Boisvert, D. (2008). Expressive-assertivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89, 169–203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Boisvert, D. (2014). Expressivism, nondeclaratives, and success-conditional semantics. In G. Fletcher & M. Ridge (Eds.), Having it both ways: Hybrid theories and modern metaethics (pp. 22–50). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Boisvert, D., & Ludwig, K. (2006). Semantics for nondeclaratives. In E. Lepore & B. Smith (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of language (pp. 864–892). Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  6. Burgess, J. P. (1983). Why i am not a nominalist. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 24, 93–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. de Sousa, R. (1979). The rationality of emotions. Dialogue, 18, 41–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Dummett, M. (1981). Frege: Philosophy of language (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Harvard UP.Google Scholar
  9. Finlay, S. (2004). The conversational practicality of value judgement. The Journal of Ethics, 8, 205–223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Geach, P. T. (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review, 69, 221–225.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Geach, P. T. (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review, 74, 449–465.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Gibbard, A. (2003). Thinking how to live. Cambridge: Harvard UP.Google Scholar
  13. Hale, B. (1993). Can there be a logic of attitudes? Reality, Representation, and Projection, ed. J. Haldane and C. Wright, New York, 337–64.Google Scholar
  14. Hanks, P. W. (2011). Structured propositions as types. Mind, 120, 11–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Hay, R. J. (2011). Hybrid expressivism and the analogy between pejoratives and moral language. European Journal of Philosophy, 21, 450–474.Google Scholar
  16. Hofstadter, A., & McKinsey, J. C. C. (1939). On the logic of imperatives. Philosophy of Science, 6, 446–457.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Hom, C., & Schwartz, J. (2013). Unity and the Frege-Geach problem. Philosophical Studies, 163, 15–24.Google Scholar
  18. Hurka, T. (1982). The speech act fallacy fallacy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12, 509–526.Google Scholar
  19. Kalderon, M. E. (2005). Moral fictionalism. Oxford: Clarendon.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Lewis, D. (1982). Logic for equivocators. Noûs, 16, 431–441.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Portner, P. (2007). Imperatives and modals. Natural Language Semantics, 15, 351–383.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Potts, C. (2005). The logic of conventional implicatures. Oxford: OUP.Google Scholar
  23. Ridge, M. (2006). Ecumenical expressivism: finessing Frege. Ethics, 116, 302–336.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Ross, W. D. (1939). Foundations of ethics. Oxford: OUP.Google Scholar
  25. Rumfitt, I. (2000). “Yes” and “No”. Mind, 109, 781–823.Google Scholar
  26. Saka, P. (2007). How to think about meaning. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  27. Schroeder, M. (2008). Being for: Evaluating the semantic program of expressivism. Oxford: Clarendon.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Schroeder, M. (2009). Hybrid expressivism: virtues and vices. Ethics, 119, 257–309.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Searle, J., & Vanderveken, D. (1985). Foundations of illocutionary logic. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.Google Scholar
  30. Smiley, T. (1996). Rejection. Analysis, 56, 1–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Wedgwood, R. (2007). The nature of normativity. Oxford: Clarendon.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften, Institut für PhilosophieUniversität Duisburg-EssenEssenGermany

Personalised recommendations