, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 521–536 | Cite as

The Natural Origins of Content

  • Daniel D. Hutto
  • Glenda Satne


We review the current state of play in the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. Our diagnosis is that if there is to be progress two fundamental changes are necessary. First, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content. Second, the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always and everywhere contentful must be abandoned. Reviving and updating Haugeland’s baseball analogy in the light of these changes, we propose ways of redirecting the efforts of players on each base of his intentionality All-Star team, enabling them to start functioning effectively as a team. Only then is it likely that they will finally get their innings and maybe, just maybe, even win the game.


Content Mental representation Intentionality Biosemantics Neo-Pragmatism Intentional stance 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the ArtsUniversity of WollongongWollongongAustralia
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyAlberto Hurtado UniversitySantiagoChile

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