Advertisement

Philosophia

, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 537–547 | Cite as

The Genealogy of Content or the Future of an Illusion

  • Alex Rosenberg
Article

Abstract

Eliminativism about intentional content argues for its conclusion from the partial correctness of all three of the theses Hutto and Satne seek to combine: neo-Cartesianism is correct to this extent: if there is intentional content it must originally be mental. Neo-Behaviorism is correct to this extent: attribution of intentional content is basically a heuristic device for predicting the behavior of higher vertebrates. Neo-Pragmatism is right to this extent: the illusion of intentionality in language is the source of the illusion of intentionality in thought. Eliminativists employ the insights of all three “neo”-theses to explain why there is no such thing and why the systematic illusion that there is intentional content runs so deep.

Keywords

Intentionality Teleosemantics Naturalization Interpretation 

References

  1. Dennett, D.C. (1969). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.Google Scholar
  2. Dennett, D. (1991). Real patterns. Journal of Philosophy, 88, 27–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Dennett, D. (1995). Darwin’s dangerous idea. New York: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
  4. Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
  5. Fodor, J. (1991). The theory of content. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  6. Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In D. Chalmers(ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Hutto, D., & Satne, G. (2014). The natural origins of content. Philosophia, present issue.Google Scholar
  8. Lewis, D. (1969). Convention, Harvard.Google Scholar
  9. Quine, W. V. O. (1961). Word and object. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  10. Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Skyrms, B. (2010). Signals, evolution, leaning and information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Duke UniversityDurhamUSA

Personalised recommendations