Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Divine Revelation
- 214 Downloads
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) states that for S to have knowledge, S must have a virtuously formed safe true belief. S’s belief that p is safe if, in most near-by possible worlds where S’s belief is formed in the same manner as in the actual world, S’s belief is true. S’s safe belief that p is virtuously formed if S’s safe belief is formed using reliable and well-integrated cognitive processes and it is to S’s credit that she formed the belief. In this paper, I offer a novel counterexample to ALVE. I offer a case where an individual forms a belief on the basis of divine revelation. Intuitively the person has knowledge, but ALVE predicts otherwise. The upshot is not only that we have a counter example to ALVE, but also, that ALVE may not serve the needs of an adequate religious epistemology.
KeywordsAnti-luck virtue epistemology Safety Virtue epistemology Divine revelation
I would like to thank the journal referees for helpful feedback.
- Greco, J. (1999). Agent Reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 273–296.Google Scholar
- King, R. (2012). Divine revelation. Philosophy Compass, 7, 495–505.Google Scholar
- Lackey, J. (2007). Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese, 3, 345–361.Google Scholar
- Pritchard, D. (2012a). Anti-luck virtue epistemology. Journal of Philosophy, 109, 247–279.Google Scholar
- Pritchard, D. (2010). Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis. Synthese, 175, 133–151. doi: 10.1007/s11229-010-9738-y.
- Pritchard, D. (2007). Anti-luck epistemology. Synthese, 158, 277–297. doi: 10.1007/s11229-006-9039-7.
- Roland, J., & Cogburn, J. (2011). Anti-luck epistemologies and necessary truths. Philosophia, 39, 547–561. doi: 10.1007/s11406-010-9295-0.