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Philosophia

, Volume 42, Issue 2, pp 309–320 | Cite as

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Divine Revelation

  • Christopher BobierEmail author
Article

Abstract

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) states that for S to have knowledge, S must have a virtuously formed safe true belief. S’s belief that p is safe if, in most near-by possible worlds where S’s belief is formed in the same manner as in the actual world, S’s belief is true. S’s safe belief that p is virtuously formed if S’s safe belief is formed using reliable and well-integrated cognitive processes and it is to S’s credit that she formed the belief. In this paper, I offer a novel counterexample to ALVE. I offer a case where an individual forms a belief on the basis of divine revelation. Intuitively the person has knowledge, but ALVE predicts otherwise. The upshot is not only that we have a counter example to ALVE, but also, that ALVE may not serve the needs of an adequate religious epistemology.

Keywords

Anti-luck virtue epistemology Safety Virtue epistemology Divine revelation 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the journal referees for helpful feedback.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California, IrvineIrvineUSA

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