Philosophia

, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp 41–53 | Cite as

How We Choose Our Beliefs

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Abstract

Recent years have seen increasing attacks on the "deontological" conception (or as we call it, the guidance conception) of epistemic justification, the view that epistemology offers advice to knowers in forming beliefs responsibly. Critics challenge an important presupposition of the guidance conception: doxastic voluntarism, the view that we choose our beliefs. We assume that epistemic guidance is indispensable, and seek to answer objections to doxastic voluntarism, most prominently William Alston's. We contend that Alston falsely assumes that choice of belief requires the assent to a specific propositional content. We argue that beliefs can be chosen under descriptions which do not specify their propositional content, but instead specify the mental actions by which they are formed and maintained. We argue that these actions partially constitute the beliefs and that is it in virtue of resulting from and being partially constituted by such actions that the beliefs are subject to epistemic appraisal.

Keywords

Doxastic voluntarism Belief Mental states Mental actions Epistemic normativity Guidance conception of epistemology Epistemic deontologism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBoston UniversityBostonUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyLoyola University New OrleansNew OrleansUSA

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