Abstract
This paper discusses psychological hedonism with a special reference to the writings of Bishop Butler, and Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson. Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, Sober and Wilson have claimed that Butler failed to refute psychological hedonism. In this paper it is argued: (1) that there is a difference between reductive and ultimate psychological hedonism; (2) that Butler failed to refute ultimate psychological hedonism, but that he succeeded in refuting reductive psychological hedonism; and, finally and more importantly, (3) that Butler’s criticism of reductive hedonism can be used as a stepping-stone in another argument showing the implausibility of ultimate psychological hedonism as well.
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Notes
Three things before proceeding: (1) Sober (1992) limits his discussion to psychological hedonism, which says that every ultimate desire is a desire to obtain pleasure or avoid pain. A similar tactic is used in Sober and Wilson (1998, p. 297) for the reason that “defenders of psychological egoism inevitably invoke the ultimate desire to attain pleasure and avoid pain to save egoism from refutation.” For brevity’s sake, I shall also limit my discussion to psychological hedonism. (2) In a subsequent paper Sober has himself raised the question whether or not Butler may have had a different thesis as his target: “Did Butler fail to refute hedonism in the stone argument because he wasn’t even trying to do so?” (Sober 2000, p. 135). (3) Finally, it should be noted that although critical of Butler’s argument, Sober and Wilson do not subscribe to psychological hedonism or egoism. In chapter 10 of Unto Others (1998) they present a case against hedonism and egoism based on evolutionary considerations. To keep this text short I have decided not to discuss Sober and Wilson’s argument, but rather to present my own argument as a supplement to theirs.
It has been pointed out to me that Sidgwick already raised this issue in his The Methods of Ethics (1874/2011), Book I, chapter 4.
For a further discussion concerning premise 2., see Stewart (1992).
Penelhum (1985, p. 53) also interprets Butler’s case against psychological hedonism as a case against the claim that there are no desires for anything but one’s own pleasure.
Zellner (1999, p. 195) claims that they were not.
Admittedly, with the argument stated liked this, the conclusion, 3., is contained in premiss 2. It seems to me, however, that the truth of 2. is more evident than the truth of 3; 2. is a reminder of 3. Another reason for formulating the argument like this is that Butler argues independently for 2. (see the passage quoted earlier).
Butler himself does not formulate this type of argument. He seems rather to be content with showing that people sometimes have desires for other things besides their own pleasure. He then simply asserts that among these desires are desires for the well-being of others. Hume gives a slightly more elaborated argument in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Hume 1975, pp. 296 f.). After having repeated Butler’s argument against the claim that there are no desires for external things, Hume goes on to point out some obvious examples of such desires: first, that people have certain bodily wants and appetites, like, e.g., hunger and thirst; and, secondly, that people have certain “mental passions”, which drive them to attain other objects, such as, e.g., fame, power and vengeance. He then raises the question why it should be so difficult to believe that besides these desires, people should also have a natural desire for other people’s well-being: “Now where is the difficulty in conceiving, that this may likewise be the case with benevolence and friendship, and that, from the original frame of our temper, we may feel a desire of another’s happiness and good, which, by means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is afterwards pursued, from the combined motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment?” (Hume 1975, p. 302).
Once this desire is in place the satisfaction of it will have the power to elicit feelings of pleasure and satisfaction in the employees and the students. Hence, with these desires they stand to gain both an external and an internal benefit from the happiness of the boss and the teachers. This is perfectly natural, and it is in complete accord with psychological hedonism. What I want to argue is that it is more difficult to explain why a person has a desire for a certain thing, e.g., the happiness of another, when this person does not believe that this thing can give rise to an external benefit.
References
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Thanks to all the referees for their comments and questions, and to HLIV, Dalarna University for financial support!
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Nilsson, P. Butler’s Stone and Ultimate Psychological Hedonism. Philosophia 41, 545–553 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9411-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9411-4