The probability of R given N and E is low or inscrutable.
Anyone who sees (1) and accepts (N&E) has a defeater for R, and this defeater cannot be defeated or deflected.
Anyone who has an undefeated, undeflected defeater for R has an undefeated, undeflected defeater for everything she believes.
Therefore she has an undefeated, undeflected defeater for (N&E).
KeywordsEvolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN) Plantinga Teleosemantics Millikan Productivity
Several friends helped in the development of this paper, including Franz Huber, Ruth Millikan,DouglasOwings, and Franklin Scott. An anonymous referee for this journal provided detailed and thoughtful comments and deserves special thanks.
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