Philosophia

, Volume 40, Issue 2, pp 357–363 | Cite as

Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth

Article

Abstract

A principal challenge for a deflationary theory is to explain the value of truth: why we aim for true beliefs, abhor dishonesty, and so on. The problem arises because deflationism sees truth as a mere logical property and the truth predicate as serving primarily as a device of generalization. Paul Horwich, attempts to show how deflationism can account for the value of truth. Drawing on the work of J. L. Austin, I argue that his account, which focuses on belief, cannot adequately accommodate the complex role that truth plays in the norms governing assertion and similar speech acts.

Keywords

Truth Deflationary theory Austin, J. L. Horwich, Paul Dummett, Michael Speech acts 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWichita State UniversityWichitaUSA

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